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Supreme Court Upends Nearly a Century of Administrative Law Precedents

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Supreme Court Upends Nearly a Century of Administrative Law Precedents

Supreme Court Upends Nearly a Century of Administrative Law Precedents

In a case that has upended nearly a century of administrative law precedents, the Supreme Court ruled in Trump v. Slaughter that the President has the power to remove the heads of multimember independent agencies without cause. 2026 WL 1855612 (Jun. 29, 2026).

Soon after the Trump Administration began its second term in 2025, President Trump fired Democratic appointees at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya. The FTC’s organic statute holds that Commissioners may be removed by the president only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U.S.C. § 41. The only reason given by the President for the removals of Slaughter and Bedoya was that their continued service on the FTC was “inconsistent” with the Administration’s priorities. Slaughter brought suit seeking an injunction to restore her to her position, alleging that her removal violated the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Majority, advanced a unitary executive theory of the Constitution that vests “the whole executive power in just one person,” citing to the Federalist Papers to justify its position. 2026 WL 1855612 at *7 (internal quotations omitted). The Court then proceeded to explain that “we long abandoned the notion that there are some powers that are only partly executive,” and that “the FTC exercises executive power.” Id. at *14 (emphasis in original). Any agency that exercises any executive power, no matter whether it primarily undertakes judicial or legislative duties, is thus subject to the final say of the President. See id.

The Court contended that Slaughter provided no reason for why she should prevail except that “Congress has relied upon Humphrey’s to create agencies that are insulated from presidential control.” Id. at *16 (internal quotations omitted). But the Court held that while “Congress may well have relied on Humphrey’s in taking more power for itself… [n]o branch may rely on adverse possession to claim power that the Constitution vests elsewhere.” Id. “With these principles in mind,” the Court held that the “FTC’s for-cause removal provision violates the separation of powers” because “[t]he tasks it undertakes are the very essence of the execution of the law—precisely the President’s constitutional role.” Id. at *17 (internal quotations omitted).

The Court’s decision overruled nearly a century of stare decisis since Humphrey’s Executor. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Humphrey’s was not decided arbitrarily, but for substantive reasons: “The work of [the FTC] will be of a most exacting and difficult character, demanding persons who have experience in the problems to be met—that is, a proper knowledge of both the public requirements and the practical affairs of industry.” Id. at 624 (quoting the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce’s Report to the Senate, No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 10, 11). The Humphrey’s Court limited the presidential power to remove officers without cause “to purely executive officers,” id. at 632, because it recognized that for the FTC was “to be nonpartisan[,] it must, from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law.” 295 U.S. 602, 624. Insulation from executive influence was “essential” so that “the commission should not be open to the suspicion of partisan direction.” Id. at 625.

Despite the Supreme Court’s insistence in Slaughter that executive power be unitary, agencies like the FTC exercise the powers of all three branches of government, and the Court’s decision subsumes the function of co-equal branches of government under the authority of one man. The constitutional charge to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” was intended by the Founders as a limitation, not as authority to expand executive power over Congress. See Dissent, 2026 WL 1855612 at *37. “Dozens of independent commissions are now likely to become purely executive agencies, shifting tremendous power over broad swaths of American life into the President’s hands.” Id. at *46.

The implications of the Court’s decision on the federal enforcement of employee rights are tremendous. Multimember federal agencies tasked with the investigation of civil rights, discrimination, and labor complaints, such as the EEOC and the NLRB, can now be staffed by political appointees with no safeguards to ensure their impartiality. Without federal oversight, employees must increasingly rely on state agencies like the California Civil Rights Department (CRD) or bring private suit to ensure that “the Laws be faithfully executed” – but many states offer no protections. Moreover, federal government and public employees who dedicate their careers to the country to make it run effectively will now have even less recourse against the political whims of whatever administration is in power.

If you have questions about your workplace rights, contact Bryan Schwartz Law, P.C..

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